

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DOS Review Completed

November 28, 1971

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Dear Dick:

You should seek an appointment with the Chinese Ambassador on Monday, November 29, 1971. At that meeting you should hand over the enclosed note. In addition, I have an oral message for you which I will be talking to you about.

Thanks again for your continued good work.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Brigadier General U. S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Encl

Major General Vernon A. Walters
Senior Defense Attache
American Embassy
Paris, France

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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1. The U. S. side would propose the following with regard to the advance trip to make detailed arrangements for the President's visit:

-- Dates. It would be most convenient for the U. S. if the trip could be conducted during the period from January 3 through January 10, 1972. Alternate dates would be January 10 through 17 but they are much less convenient.

-- Locations. The group would like to visit Shanghai, Hangchow and Peking to survey each site that the President would visit, including residences, meeting rooms, and locations for various events. It is estimated that the team would need about 1 1/2 days each in Shanghai and Hangchow and four or five days in Peking. The best procedure might be to visit Peking first for two days, then go to Shanghai and Hangchow, returning to Peking to complete any unfinished business.

-- Size of Party. The U. S. would like to send a group of about twenty persons in addition to the aircraft crew of some seventeen persons. The names of these individuals in protocol order will be forwarded to the People's Republic of China well in advance of the agreed date for the trip. It is presently anticipated that the team will be headed by Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., U. S. Army, who is the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and who has Dr. Kissinger's complete confidence.

2. As a related technical matter, there is a preliminary action concerning the ground satellite terminal which it would be useful to take prior to arrival of the advance party in January. The INTELSAT Communications Satellite Committee which controls the satellites that will relay signals from the ground satellite terminal is meeting during the week of December 8 and is not scheduled to meet again until February 23. To preclude having to reconvene the group during the intervening period, it is proposed that the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), which manages INTELSAT, request authority from the Committee at the December 8 meeting to approve an application for use of satellite facilities if received at a subsequent date from the People's Republic of China.

This action would not commit the People's Republic of China to use these facilities, but would merely be a preliminary step to ensure that arrangements can be made efficiently once the PRC has determined that they are satisfactory. A formal application by the People's Republic of China could be made after the January visit when a detailed presentation of the facilities the U. S. recommends and various leasing options will be made.

3. With regard to the November 20 Chinese note on the India-Pakistan situation, President Nixon wanted Prime Minister

Chou En-lai to be informed of the various steps that the U. S. Government has taken in recent days, on this question.

On November 23, Dr. Kissinger, in his meeting with Ambassador Huang Hua, exchanged views on this matter in the context of United Nations business. This discussion included the possibility of a UN Security Council resolution which might have a restraining impact. After consultation with the Pakistani government this resolution has been strengthened. Enclosed is a copy of the kind of strengthened resolution we are prepared to support.

On November 23, the U. S. Ambassador in New Delhi was instructed to make a strong demarche to the Indian Government, informing it that the U. S. Government and people would not understand an Indian decision to resort to war. On November 29, an even stronger representation was made to Prime Minister Gandhi on the situation, including our inquiry concerning India's failure to respond to the U. S. proposal already agreed to by President Yahya that both sides pull back their forces from the borders.

On November 23, the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to urge the Soviet Government to exercise restraint on India. On November 27, a letter from the President to Premier Kosygin reinforced this request and warned of the consequences of continued hostilities.

On November 23, Dr. Kissinger talked to Chancellor Brandt on behalf of the President. Dr. Kissinger informed the Chancellor of U. S. thinking on a possible UN Security Council resolution and said that the U. S. would appreciate a demarche to the Indian Government from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, urging an end to military action.

On November 24, Dr. Kissinger informed the British Ambassador of U. S. thinking on a possible UN Security Council resolution. It was emphasized that the U. S. would leave to the Government of Pakistan the decision as to whether the issue should be referred to the UN Security Council. The U. S. side asked the British to support Pakistan in the UN or, if this proved impossible, to refrain from supporting India.

On November 25, the President called Prime Minister Heath to express his concern over the India-Pakistan situation and the Indian actions which have contributed to its deterioration. He told the Prime Minister that while urging restraint in the subcontinent the U. S. will favor Pakistan in its comments. He repeated Dr. Kissinger's representation of the previous day.

The U. S. is now using administrative techniques to delay implementing economic assistance measures for India.

On November 30, the U. S. Director of the World Bank will warn the other directors of the adverse impact on Indian development caused by the outbreak of war.

At the next Indian incursion, the U. S. will suspend the shipment of arms to India (now at a very low level -- about \$5 million per year).

Other steps are under consideration, including actions the U. S. might take if full hostilities erupt.

The U. S. is keeping the Government of Pakistan fully informed of all steps it is taking with regard to this situation.

4. In line with the U. S. practice of informing the Prime Minister of negotiations of possible interest, the U. S. Government would like to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China of the current state of our negotiations with the USSR on the subject of incidents at sea. As a result of discussions in Moscow from October 12 to 22, 1971, both sides' delegations agreed to refer the following provisions to their respective governments as the basis for an agreement:

Both sides will instruct commanding officers to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the international rules of the road.

-- Commanding officers will keep their ships far enough apart to avoid risk of collision.

-- Ships engaged in surveillance operations will keep enough distance to avoid risk of collision and to avoid endangering the ships under surveillance.

-- Ships of both sides operating within sight of each other will show correct international signals (flag, sound and light).

-- Ships of both sides will not simulate attacks by aiming their guns or other armament at a passing ship, or by launching an object in the direction of a passing ship.

-- Ships will not use their searchlights at night to 'blind' the bridge personnel on passing ships.

-- Ships will show correct international signals when conducting exercises with submerged submarines.

-- Ships will stay well clear of ships of the other side engaged in such operations as aircraft carrier launch and recovery.

-- Pilots will be instructed to use the greatest prudence and caution when approaching ships of the other side.

-- Pilots will be instructed to display correct navigation lights.

-- Ships planning to conduct flight operations will be required to give appropriate signals.

-- Pilots will be instructed not to make simulated attacks by the simulated use of weapons against ships, and not to perform acrobatic maneuvers over ships, including supersonic overflights.

-- Arrangements for the mutual exchange of information regarding collisions and other incidents at sea should be established.

-- The question of overflights should be thoroughly examined during the next round of talks (expected to be in Washington early in 1972).

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Noting the memoranda of the Secretary General dated July 10, 1971 and October 20, 1971 to the President of the Security Council;

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Deeply concerned that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border could constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2) Calls for an immediate withdrawal of any foreign forces present on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan border;

3) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a political climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

4) Calls upon all states to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;

5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offering good offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in the area.

6) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.